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Neurodiversity and the Family Courts – new guidance seeks to bridge the gap. Will it work? A view from the bar – [2025] Fam Law 1021

Chambers is again excited to share that barrister, Chloe Branton, and pupil Avaia Williams have recently been published in Family Law Journal, sharing their analysis and thoughts on the Family Justice Council neurodiversity guidance.  In their article, Chloe and Avaia reflect on the guidance and how it will play out in the Family Justice System, and how it is already playing out. Chloe and Avaia are regularly instructed in matters acting for neurodiverse parties and share their top tips for ensuring the guidance is more than just a soundbite, including exploring:  <ul class="wp-block-list"> <li>why recognising neurodiverse needs is essential to fair access to justice;</li>  <li>the risks of flawed assessments where neurodivergence is overlooked;</li>  <li>the practical recommendations offered by the guidance, including the use of frameworks such as SPELL; and</li>  <li>the need for consistent adoption across the system, from judges to practitioners to court staff.</li> </ul>  Drawing on both professional and personal experience of working with neurodiverse clients and witnesses, they highlight how relatively simple adjustments can make a profound difference to participation and outcomes.  Understanding neurodivergence is not an optional courtesy but a fundamental requirement of fairness in family proceedings. The promises of the new guidance depend on meaningful and systemic change, and consistent implementation.  The full article is available in the August issue of Family Law, for those with subscriptions this can be found on Lexis Nexis.

Trial Success for Howard Elgot and Megan Crowther: HQA v Newcastle-upon-Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust

<a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/howard-elgot/">Howard Elgot</a> and <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/megan-crowther/">Megan Crowther</a> of Parklane Plowden Chambers, instructed by David Bradshaw of <a href="https://www.hay-kilner.co.uk/">Hay & Kilner LLP</a>, acted for the Claimant in her claim against the Newcastle-Upon-Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust, in a 5-day High Court trial at the Royal Courts of Justice, in June. The trial was to determine breach of duty and causation. Liability had been strongly contested by the Trust; but the Claimant succeeded on issues of (1) informed consent; (2) breach of duty by the surgeon in the planning of the operation; and also (3) in establishing that 13 minutes of cerebral hypoxia would have been avoided had the operation been planned appropriately. The matter will proceed to an assessment of damages hearing in due course.  The claim was brought after the Claimant, who can be referred to only as HQA because of an anonymity order made by the High Court, suffered severe brain damage after undergoing open heart surgery at the Freeman Hospital, Newcastle. The Claimant had suffered congenital heart problems from birth and had undergone many operations and other procedures over her lifetime. In order to gain access to her heart, the surgeon used an oscillating saw. The saw slipped, and instead of the saw cutting through only the anterior section of the Claimant’s sternum, the saw went fully through the sternum and into her aorta, causing catastrophic bleeding  which led to the cutting off of the blood supply to her brain. It then took so long for the surgeons to put the Claimant on cardio-pulmonary bypass that she suffered very severe hypoxic brain damage. The time was prolonged in part because another surgeon, who had been called in because of the emergency, attempted to cannulate one femoral artery, but the artery dissected, and another femoral artery had to be prepared and cannulated. Following the operation, HQA’s family were told to expect the worst, but the Claimant has at least made a partial recovery.  The Court held that the Defendant failed to obtain the Claimant’s informed consent for her surgery and further, that the surgeons failed to plan adequately for the possibility of the catastrophic event that occurred.  The Court accepted the general thrust of the Claimant’s expert’s evidence that the Claimant’s aorta was sufficiently close to the rear of her sternum, at least in places, to mean that no surgeon could be confident, in a re-do sternotomy, of being able to open the sternum without causing injury to the enlarged aorta. As a result, the minimum level of precaution required was to expose and prepare the relevant groin vessels as a preparatory step, in case emergency bypass was required. The Defendant failed to take this step. The Court held that more than half of the time taken to establish cardiopulmonary bypass would have been saved, but for the negligence. As a result, the Claimant sustained a prolonged period of hypoxia.  Furthermore, the Court found that the above mitigating steps should have been discussed with the Claimant during the consenting process: “It is not for the surgeon to determine, for the Claimant, what the Claimant’s risk appetite should be”. It was also held that in this case, it was “unacceptable practice” for the surgeon to see the patient for the first time on the day of the intended surgery in order to explain the risks of the operation for the purposes of seeking to obtain informed consent. The Court agreed with the Claimant’s expert’s view that the consenting process was “chaotic”.  The claim is estimated to have a value of over £5,000,000.

Jury finds shortcomings, flaws and missed opportunities in care of detained patient: Leila Benyounes acts in Article 2 Inquest

Leila Benyounes represented the Family of Donna Levin in an Article 2 inquest at Teesside Coroner’s Court presided over by the Senior Coroner for Teesside and Hartlepool, Ms Clare Bailey, sitting with a jury.  Donna, who was a much loved 54-year-old mother of three and special educational needs teacher, was admitted to Roseberry Park Hospital on 28 December 2019 following increased concerns for her safety by her Family. She had been struggling with her mental health for a few months and had been diagnosed with obsessive compulsive disorder. Donna died on 8 January after being found unresponsive in her room at the hospital on 4 January 2020 whilst she was detained under the Mental Health Act.  Following a seven-day inquest during which fourteen live witnesses gave evidence, the jury found that there were shortcomings, flaws and missed opportunities in the care provided to Donna.  The jury found that key risk information was not included in a verbal handover from day staff to night staff or recorded in the electronic medical records, some of which were amended after events. These shortcomings meant that Donna’s risk levels were not amended in a risk assessment, and there was no change to the minimum hourly level of observations and engagements, which should have been increased.  After Donna asked to leave the ward to kill herself, and Donna was detained under the Mental Health Act, the jury found that there was no further assessment to take into account Donna’s further deterioration. Planned hourly checks were not undertaken, the observation sheet was falsely completed, and there were several missed opportunities in the doctor seeing Donna. Significantly, the jury found that the risk management plan and risk safety were not updated appropriately.  In concluding that Donna died by suicide due to suffering from a mental illness, the jury found that the risks of encouraging sleep to support long term treatment did not outweigh the risk of ensuring short term safety and the risks should have been further considered until the doctor saw Donna.  Links to local news articles:  <a href="https://www.thenorthernecho.co.uk/news/25351119.family-stockton-teacher-donna-levin-release-statement-inquest/">Family of Stockton teacher Donna Levin release statement after inquest</a>  <a href="https://www.gazettelive.co.uk/news/teesside-news/donna-levin-roseberry-park-death-32162956">Family’s ‘painful clarity after clear shortcomings’ in bubbly mum’s care at Roseberry Park Hospital</a>  <a href="https://www.gazettelive.co.uk/news/teesside-news/donna-levin-inquest-roseberry-park-32151354">Jury retire in inquest into ‘full of joy’ teacher allegedly failed by Roseberry Park Hospital</a>  <a href="https://www.thenorthernecho.co.uk/news/25339276.staff-missed-check-patient-roseberry-park-hospital/">Staff missed check on mum at Roseberry Park Hospital before tragedy</a>  Ms Benyounes was instructed by Lois Hepworth of Watson Woodhouse Solicitors.  Leila Benyounes is Head of the Inquests Team at Parklane Plowden Chambers and is ranked by Legal 500 and Chambers and Partners for Inquests and Inquiries and Clinical Negligence. Leila is appointed as an Assistant Coroner in two coronial areas and Leila regularly represents interested persons in a wide range of inquests including Article 2 jury inquests and complex medical matters. She has a special interest in obstetric, birth injury and fatal cases providing representation at inquest and in clinical negligence claims. She has been appointed to the Attorney General Regional Civil Panel Band A since 2010. Her full profile can be accessed <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/barristers/leila-benyounes">here</a>.

Fiat accompli? R (Campbell) v HM Attorney General for England and Wales [2025] EWHC 1653 (Admin)

There are two ways of reading the judgment in <a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Campbell-v-Attorney-General.pdf">R (Campbell) v HM Attorney General for England and Wales [2025] EWHC 1653 (Admin)</a>.  For those who are fans of legal theory, there is a meticulous examination of the role and functions of the Attorney General. The Divisional Court considered his functions (for it is currently a “he”) relating to criminal law (such as consenting to certain prosecutions, dealing with contempt of court, and appeals against unduly lenient sentences) and civil law (for example, in relation to vexatious litigants and special advocates). It conducted a detailed examination of the limitations on the justiciability of his decisions. It concluded with a carefully reasoned decision, ultimately refusing permission to apply for judicial review.  For everyone else, there’s paragraph 56.  The question  Mr Campbell’s brother, Geoffrey, was killed when the North Tower of the World Trade Centre collapsed on 11th September 2001. HM Senior Coroner for West London held an inquest in January 2013, in which she recorded that an aircraft was flown into the building as part of Al-Qaeda’s co-ordinated attack, thereby causing its collapse.  Mr Campbell does not accept that the building collapsed due to the impact of the aircraft. He believes it was caused by the detonation of pre-planted explosives or incendiaries.  Section 13(1)(b) of the Coroners Act 1988 permits the High court to quash an inquisition and direct a fresh investigation (or a first investigation, where none has been held). Before doing so, the High Court must be satisfied either that the coroner has refused or neglected to hold an inquest or an investigation which ought to be held, or that it is necessary or desirable in the interests of justice to hold another investigation where the first was tainted by fraud, rejection of evidence, irregularity of proceedings, insufficiency of inquiry, the discovery of new facts or evidence or otherwise. The application to the High Court must be made by or under the authority or "fiat" of the Attorney General.  Mr Campbell accordingly applied to the Attorney General for authority to apply to the High Court. It was refused.  Mr Campbell sought judicial review of that refusal. It was said that the Attorney General (in fact, the Solicitor General who made the decision on his behalf) had erred in law, made a decision which was irrational and unreasonable, and had failed to give adequate reasons. The Summary Grounds of Defence asserted that the challenged decision was not justiciable at all (or alternatively was challengeable only on exceptional grounds, such as fraud, corruption or bad faith).  The answer  The short answer is that the Attorney General’s decision was not justiciable. Permission to apply for judicial review was refused.  The slightly longer answer involves consideration of authorities stretching back to 1855. The courts developed the clear position that decisions taken by the Attorney General in the exercise of his “public interest” functions were not justiciable in proceedings seeking the prerogative writ of mandamus (the forerunner to modern judicial review). If the Attorney General was answerable to anyone, it was to Parliament.  A key case was Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers[1978] AC 435. Broad observations were made in that case by the House of Lords as to the courts’ lack of jurisdiction to review the Attorney General’s decisions. Gouriet concerned the Attorney General’s refusal of consent to bring relator proceedings (actions brought by private individuals in the Attorney General’s name, in order to enforce a public right), but the principle is not confined to such proceedings. In R v Attorney General ex p. Ferrante (unreported, 1st July 1994) it was said that Gouriet is of general application, and that whether or not a decision is amendable to judicial review depends on its nature and subject matter.  The Divisional Court concluded that the authorities demonstrated that there is a class of discretionary functions of the Attorney General “whose exercise [are] categorically immune from review”. That class includes the Attorney General’s powers to enforce the law by bringing criminal or civil proceedings in the public interest, and powers to authorise or terminate such proceedings by others. The function in section 13(1)(b) of the 1988 Act is one such power.  Accordingly, the refusal of consent was not justiciable, and it was not open to Mr Campbell to seek judicial review of it.  In the alternative, the Divisional Court said that if the decision had been justiciable, then the only grounds for review would have been dishonesty, bad faith or an exceptional circumstance (none of which applied in this case).  The future?  This is not a decision which appears to have been reached with any degree of enthusiasm.  The Divisional Court noted that the identification of a category of decisions as immune from review on any grounds appears “anomalous”. The fact that the Attorney General is accountable to Parliament, said the Court, “hardly distinguishes those decisions from many others which today would certainly be justiciable” (paragraph 47). In paragraph 54, the Court noted that it must be for a higher court to say if the principle in Gouriet is no longer good law in relation to the Attorney General’s powers. The combined effect of existing authority “is that it is not now open to any court below the Supreme Court to decide otherwise, however anomalous this may seem in the light of the rest of the modern law of judicial review”.  One to watch.  Peter Yates is part of the Inquests Team at Parklane Plowden. Peter's profile can be accessed <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/peter-yates/">here</a>.

Court Affirms Gender Reassignment Surgery as a Joint Financial Responsibility – JY V KF {2025} EWFC 195

In a first instance decision by HHJ Farquhar sitting in the Brighton Family Court, the court considered as a specific issue whether the costs of the respondent’s gender reassignment surgery should be met from the matrimonial pot.  The parties were ‘high net worth’ individuals, with assets totalling over £3,000.000. Their legal costs totalled over £1,000.000.  When the parties met in 1998, the respondent was a biological male. The applicant stated that in 2022 the respondent had informed her, that she was intending to ‘transition’ to a woman. The respondent stated that the applicant was aware she was a trans-person before they married in 2002.  The Court described the issue as ‘having generated significant emotion from both of the parties,’ the applicant’s position was that the marriage had broken down as a result of the respondent’s decision to transition to a woman and undergo the surgery, and it could not be right therefore that she should have to pay half the costs of the surgery from the matrimonial funds. It was argued that if the respondent wanted the surgery, that was her choice, but it must be paid for out of her own funds.  The respondent argued that the costs of the gender reassignment surgery should be treated like any other medical cost which would ordinarily be met from the joint assets, that it would be like saying someone who had cancer should not have the surgery and accordingly the cost should be met from joint funds. The court noted that the precise costs of the surgery had not been produced, only an estimate in the region of £160,000.00, but it was satisfied this was a reasonable figure.  In considering the criteria under section 25 (2) (b) of the MCA 1973, the court found that it was difficult to see how the costs of the gender realignment surgery cannot come under the heading of ‘needs.’ It was not suggested that the costs should be considered as conduct, nor could it be. It could not come under the heading of ‘wanton or reckless’ expenditure that could warrant an add back consideration. This was clearly not akin to cosmetic surgery and could not be considered in such a light.  The court referred to the consideration of what amounts to ‘needs’ within the Family Justice Council’s ‘Guidance on Financial Needs on Divorce’ document, which was referred to by Peel J in WC v HC {2022} WFC 22 and reiterated that ‘needs is a very broad concept with no single definition in family law.’  HHJ Farquhar was satisfied that the respondent’s need was not matched by a similar need for the applicant and as such it was reasonable for the money spent meeting that need to come out of joint resources.  It remains to be seen whether this decision will be appealed. This was a case with significant assets, and it might be questioned whether the same approach would have been taken in a case with more limited resources.

Case Report: R (On the application of Jada Bailey) v HM Senior Coroner for East London [2025] EWHC 1637 (Admin)

Jaden was an individual who had been killed on 8 January 2019. An inquest to his death was formally opened on 18 January 2019. The inquest process was then overtaken by the criminal proceedings which took place, and the inquest was adjourned on 2 April 2019. Ayoub Majdouline was convicted of Jaden’s murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 21 years on 18 December 2019.  On 24 December 2019, the Coroner issued a certificate that the inquest was not to be resumed. The Claimant applied to the Coroner to resume the inquest in June 2023 and a decision not to resume the inquest was issued in a document dated 18 March 2024. Jaden’s mother, Jada Bailey (the “Claimant”), sought to judicially review that decision on three points:  <ul class="wp-block-list"> <li>The decision not to resume the inquest gives rise to a breach of the procedural obligation under ECHR Article 2;</li>  <li>The Coroner’s conclusion not to resume the inquest rested on two errors of law as to the likely utility of the resumed inquest; and</li>  <li>The decision was contrary to a duty to investigate arising at common law (this was abandoned in submissions as there is no separate common law source of either power or obligation for a Coroner to investigate – they are statutory under the Criminal Justice Act 2009). This was then adapted that the Coroner had failed to have regard to relevant considerations, namely: <ul class="wp-block-list"> <li>the public interest in holding an inquest;</li>  <li>the purpose pursued by sections 5(1) and (2) of the 2009 Act;</li>  <li>that an inquest can serve to allay any public concern arising from a death; and</li>  <li>the possibility of making a regulation 28 report.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>  The decision not to resume the inquest gives rise to a breach of the procedural obligation under ECHR Article 2  The Coroner had accepted the Claimant’s basic premise that there was an obligation to investigate under ECHR Article 2. In the usual course of inquests, the holding of an inquest discharges the investigative duty as required under the provisions of the 2009 Act. The Coroner in this case had considered that the investigative duty had been discharged already by the time the Claimant had sought to resume the inquest, as a Serious Case Review had been commissioned by the Safeguarding Children’s Board for Waltham Forest, published in May 2020.  The Claimant’s submitted that there were concerns regarding the scope and content of the SCR report; there were criticisms regarding the form of the investigation; the author of the SCR report lacked independence; the Claimant did not have sufficient opportunity to be involved in the SCR exercise; and it did not meet the requirement for public scrutiny. Further, following the SCR report, complaints raised about the conduct of the Metropolitan Police had not been properly addressed in an investigation by the Independent Office for Police Conduct.  As to the SCR report, Swift J commented:  It is readily apparent from the SCR report that it is a thorough and thoughtful consideration of all relevant matters. To my mind the SCR report is a highly impressive piece of work that should provide valuable assistance to all public authorities concerned. By identifying very clearly things they did and things they failed to do the SCR report ought both to promote accountability for what happened and to provide valuable guidance to those public authorities as regard their future conduct. Whenever considering a document such as this SCR report it will always be possible to point to further questions that could have been considered or further detail that could have been looked for. But that is not the test of whether the investigation that has been undertaken meets the requirement arising under article 2. In the circumstances of this case the investigation needed to consider the actions of the public authorities in Nottinghamshire and in London that had responsibilities that, if performed, would have served to safeguard C against the risk of falling victim to criminal exploitation. The SCR report, as written, evidences an effective investigation of the actions and omissions of those public authorities.  …  The purpose of an article 2 investigation is to consider what did happen; to establish a picture of past events. Often it will be readily apparent from findings on what did happen, what other steps should have been taken. That is so in the present case since it is clear from the SCR report that certain steps that were not taken should have been taken. But that is a by-product of the investigation.  Swift J considered that there was no principle reason why the SCR report, and the way in which the investigation had been conducted, was incapable of satisfying the article 2 duty to investigate. Swift J found that the author of the SCR report was independent and there was no suggestion that the investigation was not independent either. There was no requirement for an inquest to compel witnesses to give evidence or for certain documents to be provided, and so the argument that the SCR process did not do this had to fall away.  As to the lack of public scrutiny, Swift J held:  The requirement arising from article 2 for sufficient public scrutiny of either the investigation or its results or both, exists to ensure accountability, to promote public confidence in adherence to the substantive obligations arising under article 2, and to prevent any appearance of collusion or tolerance of unlawful acts. What is appropriate to meet these objectives is not fixed. There is no requirement that an investigation must be conducted through public hearings. I do not consider that the investigation that Mr Drew undertook was impaired by the absence of such hearings. Considered in the round, the SCR report identifies and then scrutinises the acts and omissions of the relevant public authorities.  Moreover, as to the lack of the Claimant’s involvement:  Given the factual circumstances… “I do not consider any of this shows that the Claimant was insufficiently involved in the investigation or lacked an effective opportunity to participate in and comment on the formulation of the SCR report. Rather, opportunities to participate were available from the outset of the investigation in early 2019 and, given the assistance available to the Claimant from the experienced and able solicitors who advised her, the opportunities to participate were real and substantial.”  The Coroner’s conclusion not to resume the inquest rested on two errors of law as to the likely utility of the resumed inquest  The Claimant submitted that the Coroner had failed to consider a narrative conclusion in their decision and their comments in relation to regulation 28 reports indicated a misdirection on the law.  As to the first point, Swift J remarked:  The suggested distinction between "short-form" and "narrative" conclusions that is the premise of this submission is a distinction without a difference. There is no material difference between a conclusion expressed using any of the terms listed in Note (i) and one that is in the "brief narrative" form anticipated by Note (ii). Each is intended to be descriptive: to describe the outcome of the inquest. For example, a conclusion of "unlawful killing" could be given either by simply using those words or through a narrative to the same effect.  The Coroner had referred to regulation 28 reports as ‘toothless’, and whilst Swift J considered that this was a rather colourful description; the Coroner had not misdirected himself on the law in relation to regulation 28 reports; and therefore this ground also failed.  Failure to have regard to relevant considerations  Swift J found that the Coroner did have regard to the possibility of making a regulation 28 report and that reading the decision in the round it had specifically considered and took the relevant considerations into account. This ground therefore failed.  Takeaways and practice points  The most interesting part of this decision is that the duty of the State to investigate does not have to be via the traditional inquest route and can be discharged via different avenues – there is no automatic right to an inquest. If other investigations have taken place in/around an incident one must take a holistic view of everything and consider whether it meets the article 2 duty; if so, there may not be a need for an inquest.  Bharat Jangra is part of the Inquests Team at Parklane Plowden. Bharat’s profile can be accessed <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/bharat-jangra/">here</a>.

Leila Benyounes – £1.5 million Settlement in Delay in Diagnosis of Breast Cancer

Leila Benyounes represented the Claimant in a clinical negligence claim arising from a delay in diagnosing breast cancer, resulting in permanent physical and psychological symptoms, and a loss of fertility.  As a result of the delay in diagnosis, the Claimant required a double mastectomy, chemotherapy and radiotherapy which would all have been avoided but for the negligence.  Permanent physical symptoms included bilateral breast deformity and asymmetry, chronic lymphoedema, peripheral neuropathy and chronic back pain. The Claimant developed an anxiety and depressive order and suffered loss of fertility and a reduced life expectancy as a result of the negligence.  Causation of the Claimant’s injuries and the permanent symptoms resulting in an inability to return to work was strongly contested by the Defendant. Ten disciplines of expert evidence were relied upon, and the case was listed for a 10-day trial of causation and quantum.  Leila acted for the Claimant throughout this claim in respect of pleadings and conducting conferences with experts.  Settlement in the sum of £1,545,000.00 was eventually reached at a joint settlement meeting before trial.  Leila was instructed by Lindsay Clark at <a href="https://www.switalskis.com/people">Switalskis</a>.  Leila is a specialist in the fields of Clinical Negligence and Inquests. She is Head of the Inquests Team at Parklane Plowden Chambers and is ranked as a leading junior in Legal 500 and Chambers and Partners for Clinical Negligence and Inquests and Inquiries. Her full profile can be accessed <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/barristers/leila-benyounes">here</a>

Thompson’s Application for Judicial Review: Considering when a coroner becomes functus officio and when to reconsider anonymity orders

Thompson’s Application for Judicial Review provides clarity on when a coroner becomes functus officio and that a grant of anonymity cannot be reviewed after the conclusion of an inquest.  Background  This was a legacy inquest into the death of Kathleen Thompson who died as a result of two bullets being fired into her garden in 1971.  Soldier D was called to give evidence at the inquest. His identity was anonymised. It was held that the operational duty to protect life under Article 2 was engaged and anonymity remained throughout proceedings.  On 23 June 2021 the coroner gave a summary of her findings in open court but indicated her ‘full decision’ would be circulated within days. She concluded that Soldier D, on the balance of probabilities, shot Ms Thompson in circumstances which were not justified.  A written decision was handed down 9 days after the hearing on 8 July 2021. That day the applicant’s legal representatives requested the coroner reconsidered the grant of anonymity alongside referring Soldier D to the Director of Public Prosecutions (‘DPP’).  The applicant issued an application for leave to apply for judicial review proceedings on 28 September 2022. Shortly thereafter, on 5 October 2022, the coroner sent a letter to all parties of the inquest indicating she had intended to pass on the findings to the DPP. In addressing anonymity, she invited submissions in relation to whether she was functus officio.  A separate case management order, in the judicial review proceedings, was sent on 6 October 2022 asking for the coroner’s correspondence on this issue.  On the 26 October 2022 the coroner concluded she was functus officio and not in a position to reconsider the application to rescind anonymity. She went on to add that had she not been functus officio, she would not have removed the anonymity and provided her reasoning.  First Instance  Mr Justice Scofield made a finding that the coroner had erred in law by failing to reconsider Soldier D’s anonymity after having made clear findings about the unlawful use of force.  Mr Justice Scofield went on to state that anonymity orders ought to be revisited and reviewed throughout the process of the inquest. The main factor in this case was the change in circumstances when the coroner found Soldier D had used unjustified force which resulted in Ms Thompson’s death.  Ultimately Mr Justice Scofield found any reconsideration of an Article 2 granted anonymity order would remain given the risk to Soldier D’s life would increase following the findings made.  However, Mr Justice Scofield found that the coroner was correct to find herself functus officio at the time the request to reconsider anonymity was made.  Mr Justice Scofield did not grant relief as it would serve no purpose given the coroner had clearly stated how she would have approached the matter of anonymity.  Appeal  The grounds of appeal where as follows:  <ol class="wp-block-list"> <li>Whether the judge had erred in finding she was functus officio for the purpose of reviewing whether a grant of anonymity should remain?</li>  <li>Whether, even if functus officio, the coroner could review the anonymity in the same way she could make a referral to the DPP?</li>  <li>Alternatively, whether the judge erred in refusing to remit the anonymity decision back to the coroner for reconsideration in light of the court’s judgement?</li> </ol>  The Court of Appeal noted that Rule 4 of the Coroners (Practice and Procedure) Rules (Northern Ireland 1963 (SR 1963/199) as amended (‘the 1963 rules’) set out ‘every inquest shall be opened, adjourned and closed in a formal manner’.  The Court of Appeal considered at Re McDonnell’s Application [2015] NICA 72 at [25] which interpreted rule 4 as meaning ‘…once the inquest is closed the coroner no longer has power to take any steps in relation to the conduct of the inquest. To do so would offend the rule that he has become functus officio. That includes any steps in relation to questions of anonymity and screening which he had to deal with in the course of the inquest’.  The Court of Appeal found the inquest was concluded once the coroner delivered the final written ruling on 8 July 2022.   They drew a comparison with the rules in England and Wales, namely the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (‘the 2009 Act’). In the 2009 Act there is no provision which sets out how to ‘close’ an inquest. Rather section 10 of the 2009 Act sets out what occurs at the end of an inquest, namely the coroner makes a record of inquest.  The Chief Coroner’s Guidance on the Bench Chapter 15 expands upon this stating at §13 ‘On signing the ROI [Record of Inquest] the inquest and investigation are formally concluded, and the coroner becomes functus officio. The coroner may still exercise their power under Paragraph 7 of Schedule 5 of the 2009 Act to make a report to prevent future deaths, but as their investigation has now concluded and they have no power to hear any further evidence’.  The court rejected the submission the inquest remained open by virtue of the coroner deciding whether to make a referral to the DPP. The Court of Appeal agreed with Mr Justice Scofield that the DPP was a separate obligation distinct from the coroner’s investigation and could arise after the inquest was concluded.  The Court of Appeal held the application of anonymity for a witness was part of the coroner’s common law powers in conducting proceedings.  In summarising the relevant case law, the Court of Appeal noted two situations in which anonymity may need to be reconsidered:  <ol class="wp-block-list"> <li>Where there was a material change of circumstances which merited a re-balancing of the competing interests at play; and/or</li>  <li>The coroner is requested to by either the witness, or a properly interested person (‘PIP’) on the basis that there is a change in circumstances or new information. </li> </ol>  The Court of Appeal agreed with Mr Justice Scofield in that there was a collective failure to not resolve anonymity at an appropriate time before conclusion of the inquest. The Court of Appeal held that there should have been an adjournment following the findings to allow any representations on anonymity.   As to the final ground of appeal, the Court of Appeal accepted Mr Justice Scofield’s common-sense approach. In particular, that there was no utility in quashing the inquest and remitting the matter back to the coroner as the coroner would have maintained the grant of anonymity. The Court of Appeal saw no identifiable issues with the coroner’s reasoning.  The Court of Appeal concluded four key points in order to avoid similar issues arising in future inquests:  <ol class="wp-block-list"> <li>For avoidance of any doubt a coroner should state an inquest is being opened, adjourned and closed. This should ideally be in open court.</li>  <li>It was best practice to give advance warning of the coroner’s intention to close the inquest to PIPs.</li>  <li>PIPs should seek to identify any ancillary issues as soon as possible after findings are promulgated.</li>  <li>A coroner, after making a critical finding of behaviour of an individual with anonymity, should consider whether this necessitates reopening the issue of the grant of anonymity and seek submissions to that affect.</li> </ol>  The appeal was dismissed.  Comment  Albeit this is a Northern Irish Court of Appeal case, it clearly reflects the position of the law in the 2009 Act and indeed was considered as part of the reasoning.   The judgment provides clarity on when an inquest is concluded, and the coroner becomes functus officio.  For coroners in Northern Ireland and England and Wales alike, it serves as a useful reminder of their duties in respect of anonymity irrespective of applications made by the interested persons. It highlights the need to review anonymity in situations where a critical finding being made which materially changes the circumstances.  It also serves as a reminder to interested persons to ensure they raise ancillary issues, such as anonymity, prior to conclusion of an inquest.  The full judgment can be found <a href="https://www.bailii.org/nie/cases/NICA/2025/25.pdf">here</a>.  Sophie Watson is a member of the Inquests and Inquiries Team at Parklane Plowden Chambers and regularly acts on behalf of Interested Persons at Inquests. Sophie’s full profile can be accessed <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/sophie-watson/">here</a>.

HQA v Newcastle-upon-Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust

<a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/howard-elgot/">Howard Elgot</a> and <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/megan-crowther/">Megan Crowther</a> of Parklane Plowden Chambers, instructed by David Bradshaw of <a href="https://www.hay-kilner.co.uk/">Hay & Kilner LLP</a>, acted for the Claimant in her claim against the Newcastle-upon-Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust in a 5-day High Court trial at the Royal Courts of Justice last week. Judgment has been reserved. The trial is to determine breach of duty and causation, and liability has been strongly contested by the Trust. The claim was brought after the Claimant, who can be referred to only as HQA because of an anonymity order made by the High Court, suffered severe brain damage after undergoing open heart surgery at the Freeman Hospital, Newcastle. The Claimant had suffered congenital heart problems from birth and had undergone many operations and other procedures over her lifetime. In order to gain access to her heart, the surgeon used an oscillating saw. The saw slipped, and instead of the saw cutting through only the anterior section of the Claimant’s sternum, the saw went fully through the sternum and into her aorta, cutting off the blood supply to her brain. It then took so long for the surgeons to put the Claimant on cardio-pulmonary bypass that she suffered very severe hypoxic brain damage. The time was prolonged in part because another surgeon, who had been called in because of the emergency, attempted to cannulate one femoral artery, the artery dissected, and another femoral artery had to be prepared and cannulated. Following the operation, HQA’s family were told to expect the worst, but the Claimant has at least made a partial recovery. The allegations against the hospital are that the surgeons did not obtain HQA’s informed consent to the operation, that the surgeons failed to plan adequately for the possibility of the catastrophic event that occurred, and that the operating surgeon ought to have been able to keep control of his saw. The Claimant’s expert cardiac surgeon advised that the dissection of the artery in the panic of the emergency was an inherent risk and therefore a free-standing claim relating to the arterial dissection could not be pursued. The allegations that the surgeons failed to prepare for the possibility of the aorta being pierced during the surgery were focused upon the CT Angiogram that HQA had undergone before surgery, and another CT Angiogram that she had undergone in 2016. A central issue was whether HQA’s aorta was so closely applied to the back of her sternum that any slip of the saw or use of any dissecting instrument would inevitably pierce the aorta. The claim is estimated to have a value of over £5,000,000.

The new Express Financial Remedy pilot

Speed, Simplicity, and Sense: A New Era for Modest Asset Divorce Cases?  Justice just got faster- or at least that is the aim. The new Express Financial Remedy Pilot, launched in April 2025, is set to transform how the family courts handle low to mid-asset financial remedy cases. With a streamlined two-hearing structure, frontloaded preparation, and a firm timetable from issue to final hearing, the pilot is designed to cut costs, reduce delay, and make proceedings more proportionate. The pilot is applicable for the next year across key regions in England, and this fast-track scheme is already reshaping expectations. In this article, we explain who it applies to, how it works, and what practitioners need to be aware of when dealing with pilot cases.  Who does the pilot affect?  The pilot is applicable to cases with combined net assets of £250,000 (excluding pensions) after deduction of liabilities and mortgages: in essence, the low and modest assets cases.  The pilot does not affect applications for a variation order under section 31 of the Matrimonial Causes 1973 or Part 11 of Schedule 5 to Civil Partnership Act 2004.  Please note: if, after completion of the Form A and exchange of Forms E, either party believes that the case should not form part of the pilot, they can apply to leave it by lodging a D11. If the court agrees, it will remove the case from the pilot and send a new timetable. When determining whether a case should leave the pilot, the court must consider all the circumstances including whether there are:  <ul class="wp-block-list"> <li>Complex assets or income structures;</li>  <li>Other potentially complex issues;</li>  <li>Other circumstances which would prevent an effective FDR as a first hearing, or where the final hearing is likely to require more than one day.</li> </ul>  What is the aim of the pilot?  The aim of the pilot, also known as the ‘fast-track’ procedure, is to resolve contested financial remedy cases more quickly, by having a maximum of two hearings instead of three, thereby enhancing the efficiency in the disposal of FR cases.  The pilot is implemented through Practice Direction 36ZH, which amends rule 9 of the Family Procedure Rules.  The pilot is structured as follows:  <ul class="wp-block-list"> <li>There is no first appointment.</li>  <li>The first hearing notice (form C) will list a financial dispute resolution appointment, and the following directions will be made: <ul class="wp-block-list"> <li><ul><li>Forms E 28 days before the FDR.</li></ul></li>  <li><ul><li>Agreed property valuations, mortgage raising capacity and questionnaires 14 days after mutual exchange of Forms E. If no agreement on property values is reached, expert report to be obtained.</li></ul></li>  <li><ul><li>Replies to questionnaire and property particulars 28 days thereafter.</li></ul></li>  <li><ul><li>Proposals for settlement 21 days before the FDR. These can be open or without prejudice.</li></ul></li>  <li><ul><li>Schedule of agreed issues to be filed 14 days before the FDR.</li></ul></li>  <li>ES1, ES2 and agreed chronology to be filed 7 days before the FDR.</li> </ul> </li>  <li>The FDR will take place between 16 to 20 weeks from Form A (please note: the pilot does not apply to applications for a consent order, which will continue to be dealt in the normal way).</li>  <li>If the parties reach an agreement, they will be expected to apply for a consent order. Government guidance states that this can be done after the hearing via post; legal represented parties will continue the current practice, i.e. draft consent orders for the court to approve there and then, or Heads of Agreement under Rose v Rose.</li>  <li>If no agreement is reached, the matter will be listed for a final hearing, with open proposals being filed 7 days after the FDR (as opposed to the 21 days required by FPR rule 27A). At this point the court can remove the case from the pilot if appropriate.</li>  <li>The final hearing will take place between 26 to 30 weeks after forms A and will typically last one day.</li> </ul>  Where is the pilot being implemented?  The court areas taking part in the pilot are Cheshire and Merseyside; Cleveland, Newcastle and Durham; Greater Manchester; Lancashire and Cumbria; North and West Yorkshire; West Midlands.  A full list of the pilot areas can be found at paragraph 1.5 of Practice Direction 36ZH and in the government’s short summary <a href="https://www.gov.uk/guidance/what-to-expect-if-you-are-in-the-express-financial-remedy-pilot">here</a>.  When is the pilot taking place?  The pilot automatically applies to cases where the form A is completed between 7 April 2025 and 3 April 2026.  Conclusions and observations  The fast-track procedure has been on the cards for some time, and is a welcome development which, it is hoped, will help resolve modest asset cases in a quick and efficient way and without the need to incur excessive legal costs. Practitioners are all too familiar with cases where the overall costs are almost equivalent to the asset base, and this is often due to delays. It is expected that this pilot will free up time and space for those more complex cases which require a larger share of the court’s resources and are often stuck in the system for months.  Concerns have been raised in respect of the impact that this pilot will have for litigants in person, for whom the first appointment is the first real opportunity to receive an explanation from the court of what is expected of them and the structure of the process (please see the Financial Remedies Journal article by Caroline Bowden <a href="https://financialremediesjournal.com/content/the-express-financial-remedy-pilot-ndash-a-fast-track-to-success-or-turmoil.b0619405797f437da9c6c104a66952ca.htm">here</a>).  The pilot requires a frontloading approach, which practitioners are already familiar with following the implementation of the Efficient Conduct Statement in 2022. The timetable for the fast-track process is even shorter, and it remains to be seen whether experts are able to assist the parties with these tight turnarounds. Under the pilot, it is expected that the case will conclude in the space of around 7 months from issue, and the final hearing to take place around 10 weeks after the FDR. Whilst the value of pensions is not included in the £250,000 limit and therefore a case involving a fairly large pension can still be run under the fast-track procedure, it is expected that, if a complex pension structure is involved and the report of an actuary is required pursuant to the guidance in the PAG report, parties would be advised to apply to be removed from the pilot. This would enable sufficient time for the completion of a PODE report and a proper opportunity to consider its recommendations.  In the event that matters do not resolve at the first hearing and it becomes apparent that the case needs to be removed from the pilot, it is expected that parties will remain at liberty to explore different options such as a private FDR.  Parties and practitioners must not forget the requirement to engage in NCDR. Just because the process is ‘quicker’, it does not mean that this very important step can be missed. Following the implementation of The Family Procedure (Amendment No 2) Rules 2023 on 29 April 2024, parties are expected to engage in NCDR and the court may adjourn the proceedings when this has not taken place, or consider departingfrom the general starting point that there should be no order as to costs if a party has refused to attend NCDR without a good reason. In a modest asset case, a proportionate approach to costs is of the essence and it remains to be seen whether courts will apply an even more strict approach to the above requirement to ensure parties do not become embroiled in unnecessary litigation.  Giorgia Sessi is part of the Family Team at Parklane Plowden Chambers, her profile can be accessed <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/giorgia-sessi/">here</a>.

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Neurodiversity and the Family Courts – new guidance seeks to bridge the gap. Will it work? A view from the bar &#8211; [2025] Fam Law 1021

Trial Success for Howard Elgot and Megan Crowther: HQA v Newcastle-upon-Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust

Jury finds shortcomings, flaws and missed opportunities in care of detained patient: Leila Benyounes acts in Article 2 Inquest

Fiat accompli? R (Campbell) v HM Attorney General for England and Wales [2025] EWHC 1653 (Admin)

Court Affirms Gender Reassignment Surgery as a Joint Financial Responsibility &#8211; JY V KF {2025} EWFC 195

Case Report: R (On the application of Jada Bailey) v HM Senior Coroner for East London [2025] EWHC 1637 (Admin)

Leila Benyounes &#8211; £1.5 million Settlement in Delay in Diagnosis of Breast Cancer

Thompson&#8217;s Application for Judicial Review: Considering when a coroner becomes functus officio and when to reconsider anonymity orders

HQA v Newcastle-upon-Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust

The new Express Financial Remedy pilot

Latest News

01 October 2025 | Court of Protection Grandstand

Suspicious deaths of those detained in care homes: what amounts to an arguable breach of the operational duty under Article 2?

Karen Boyle Appointed Assistant Coroner

New Clerking Appointment at Parklane Plowden

Neurodiversity and the Family Courts – new guidance seeks to bridge the gap. Will it work? A view from the bar – [2025] Fam Law 1021

Court Affirms Gender Reassignment Surgery as a Joint Financial Responsibility – JY V KF {2025} EWFC 195

Leila Benyounes – £1.5 million Settlement in Delay in Diagnosis of Breast Cancer

Thompson’s Application for Judicial Review: Considering when a coroner becomes functus officio and when to reconsider anonymity orders