Compassion vs Culpability: Morris v Morris & Ors [2024] EWHC 2554 (Ch)

Background:

Myra Morris was a 73-year-old woman with a degenerative neurological disorder that had no cure. She flew to Switzerland to attend the Pegasos clinic to end her life with medical assistance. She travelled with her husband, son, daughter, and sister. Myra therefore ended her own life with the assistance of her husband, and consequently an assisted dying offence was made out and the Forfeiture Act applied. Myra’s husband Mr Philip Morris applied for relief under section 2(2) of the Forfeiture Act 1982 in order to benefit from his late wife Myra’s estate.

Law:

Section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 states that an offence will be committed if a person:

1. Encourages or assists suicide or attempted suicide of another person, and
   
2. The person intended to encourage or assist suicide or an attempted suicide.

However, section 2(4) makes it clear that no proceedings will be brought against a person for the offence unless the DPP has provided consent.

Section 1 Forfeiture Act 1982 states that ‘Anyone involved in the unlawful killing of another will be prevented from acquiring a benefit from that killing’.

Section 2 Forfeiture Act 1982 provides the exception. The court can modify the effect of the forfeiture rule if it is “satisfied that, having regard to the conduct of the offender and of the deceased and to such other circumstances as appear to the court to be material, the justice of the case requires the effect of the rule to be so modified in that case”.

Where an application for relief is granted under section 2 of the Act, families will be able to inherit the estate of the deceased.

Issues:

The issues in the case were:

1. To what extent will the witness statement of the deceased absolve family members of suggestions of undue influence/pressure/encouragement?
   
2. What is the risk of prosecution for those involved in assisted dying?
   
3. Will involvement in the death bar family members from benefitting from the inheritance of the deceased under the Forfeiture Act 1982?
   

Decision:

Mr Justice Trower held:

1. Myra’s witness statement made shortly before she died was of “particular importance”. She outlined the “intolerable nature of her life”. This evidence led to the conclusion that merely being present at another’s death (Myra’s son, daughter and sister) will be insufficient to amount to a section 2(1) Suicide Act offence. This is because they were not directly involved in Myra’s plans to go to Switzerland. They tried to dissuade her, but she was determined to proceed.   
   
   Mr Morris accompanying her to Switzerland, completing necessary paperwork and reporting his own involvement was sufficient to make out a section 2(1) offence. This was the case despite no encouragement and the fact that Myra would have gone to Switzerland anyway.
   
   
2. The courts will adopt the Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Encouraging/Assisting Suicide guidance. This is attached here: assisted-suicide-policy.pdf
   
   The Policy Guidance lists 16 factors to consider in favour of prosecution. The court will weigh up the factors present, against factors listed against prosecution. Public interest remains a high consideration following Dunbar v Plant. Bringing charges against family members who were assisting the deceased to fulfil a wish is not likely to be in the public interest.
   
   
3. A judge will look at the guidance above as well as “the degree of moral culpability for what has happened.”
   
   The approach of moral culpability looks at the state of mind of the ‘offender’ – here, this was Myra’s husband, Mr Morris. Mr Justice Trower concluded that there was no moral culpability in the case because Mr Morris was “independently financially comfortable” and was not claiming relief for improper reasons. Therefore, the forfeiture rule was modified. Its application was excluded in full.
   

Analysis:

This case emphasises that the element of culpability or blameworthiness is not a strong consideration for coroners when deciding unlawful killings. Compared to criminal proceedings, the civil courts will look at whether ‘offenders’ – i.e. those who assisted the deceased – are instead motivated by compassion. Indeed, compassion as a motivation is a key consideration in the Policy Guidance at paragraph 45.

The reasons for compassion will also be considered. In this case, these included the type of relationship, the length of relationship, and the determination of the deceased. The court had an understanding that Myra’s “determination to proceed” was “highly relevant” when considering prosecution.

For those practicing in coronial law, this case is useful when considering possible conclusions in inquests. Even if elements of assisted dying are made out, a conclusion of unlawful killing may not be necessary. Short term conclusions are not compulsory in inquests and, in situations where context about compassion is key, a narrative conclusion may be more appropriate. The legality of the death does not require comment.

If and until the Assisted Dying Bill is passed, coroners cannot conclude ‘assisted dying’ in inquests. Therefore, a compassionate approach may instead be adopted to reflect the case law.

The full judgment can be found here: Morris v Morris & Ors [2024] EWHC 2554 (Ch) (09 October 2024).